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TAX LAW-FuNDAMENTAL INCONSISTENCY: THE TAX BENEFIT

RULE-Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134
(1983).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 1 the Supreme Court
of the United States reformulated the working definition of the Tax
Benefit Rule (TBR). In doing so, the Court rejected the positions of
both the Commissioner2 and the taxpayer (the "Bank"),3 whose inter
pretations together had constituted the working definition of the
TBR. 4 The new definition, best described as a hybrid of all past appli
cations of the TBR, 5 now applies a "fundamentally inconsistent" stan
dard when assessing the applicability of the TBR: "The tax benefit rule
will cancel out an earlier deduction only when careful examination
shows that the later event is. . . fundamentally inconsistent with the
premise on which the deduction was initially based."6 This note will
focus on the Supreme Court's analysis with respect to the new formu
lation of the TBR and will also consider its effect on the already com
plicated application.
\. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
2. The government contended that the TBR required inclusion of amounts previ
ously deducted if later events were inconsistent with the deductions and that no recovery
was necessary for application of the rule. Id. at 38\.
3. The Bank, citing Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Cullerton, 18 Ill. App. 3d 953,310 N.E.2d
845 (1974), argued that the tax refunds did not constitute taxable income because it never
received them, nor was it legally entitled to them. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381. In Lincoln,
the Illinois Appellate Court held that the refunds of personal property taxes made neces
sary by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto
Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973), and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 676.01 (1971) belonged to
the individual shareholders and not to the Bank regardless of who actually paid the taxes.
Lincoln, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 957, 310 N.E.2d at 849. Because the Bank was, therefore,
precluded from recovering any of the refund, it contended that no recovery within the
meaning of the TBR took place. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 377.
4. For a discussion of the origins of the recovery theory, see Putnam National Bank
v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1931); Excelsior Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 16
B.T.A. 886 (1929). For a discussion on the origins of the inconsistent event theory, see
Barnett v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 864 (1939); Estate of Block v. Commissioner, 39
B.T.A. 338 (1939); South Dakota Concrete Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1429
(1932).
5. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 417 (Stevens & Marshall, I.I., concurring) .
6. Id. at 383.
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Before 1971, an Illinois statute7 subjected shareholders of any of
its incorporated banks to a personal property tax on the value of their
shares. The statute required the banks to retain earnings sufficient to
cover the taxes. 8 The banks customarily paid or tendered payment of
the taxes for the shareholders and claimed a deduction for the amount
paid on the shareholders' behalf. 9 A 1970 amendment to the state
constitution invalidated the property tax on shares held in incorpo
rated banks.lO The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently struck down
the amendment on a constitutional challenge. I I . The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari 12 and, pending the disposition of the
case, Illinois continued to collect taxes placing the receipts in es
crow. \3 The United States Supreme Court ultimately upheld the
amendment. 14 The state court, thereafter, ruled that the monies held
in escrow belonged to the shareholders. IS Accordingly, the county
treasurer issued refund checks directly to each of the Bank's share
holders, payable only to them individually.16
The Bank did not report any part of the 1973 refund as taxable
income. 17 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service issued a
notice of deficiency, alleging that the Bank should have reported the
amount of the aggregate refund to its shareholders as income on its
own 1973 federal income tax return, pursuant to the TBR.18 The
Commissioner contended that recovery of the payments by the share
7.

ILL. REV.

8.
9.

Hil/sboro, 460 U.S. at 372-73.
Id. I.R.C. § 164(e) (1954), provides:

STAT. ch. 120 §§ 557-58 (1971) (repealed 1981, elf. Dec. 31, 1982).

Where a corporation pays a tax imposed on a shareholder on his interest as a
shareholder, and the corporation is not reimbursed by the shareholder, then:
(1) the deduction allowed by subsection (a) [of § 164] shall be allowed to the
corporation; and
(2) no deduction shall be allowed the shareholder for such tax.
Subsection (a) of section 164 provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section the following taxes shall be al
lowed as a deduction for the taxable year within which paid or accrued:
(1) State and local, and foreign, real property taxes;
(2) State and local personal property taxes;
(3) State and local, and foreign, income, war profits, and excess profits;
(4) State and local general sales taxes.
10. ILL. CONST. amend. art. IX-A.
11. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill.2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
12. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 405 U.S. 1039 (1972).
13. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374.
14. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
15. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cullerton, 25 Ill. App. 3d 721, 324 N.E.2d 29 (1975).
16. Hil/sboro, 460 U.S. at 374.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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holders represented income to the Bank to the extent of its prior de
duction. The Tax Court agreed l9 and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the Tax Court's decision. 20 Relying on its
prior decision in First Trust & Savings Bank v. United States,21 the
court found the tax benefit rule applicable to the refund even though
the Bank had not received the refund directly.22 The court stated that
the rule applies in any case in which one of two situations occur:
either an actual recovery of a previously deducted amount or the oc
curence of an event which is inconsistent with the premise on which
the prior deduction was based. 23 The Supreme Court found differently
and reversed. 24

II.

BACKGROUND

The TBR, a judicially developed principle,2s seeks to create trans
actional equivalence with some of the inflexible attributes of the an
nual accounting system. 26 Basically it provides to the Commissioner a
mechanism whereby a taxpayer who recovers or collects an amount
deducted from hislher taxable income in an earlier year is taxed cur
rently on the amount received, unless the prior deduction was of no
tax benefit because it did not reduce hislher tax liability.27 The doc
trine does not limit application of the TBR to an actual physical recov
ery by the taxpayer of a tangible asset or sum. 28 It has long been
accepted that a taxpayer using accrual accounting who accrued and
deducted an expense in a tax year prior to the expense becoming paya
ble and who is eventually relieved of that liability must then include
that amount of accrued expense in gross income. 29
19. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 61 (1979).
20. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1981).
21. 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980).
22. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1981).
23. [d.
24. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 394-95.
25. Although the rule originated in courts, 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL IN
COME TAXATION § 7.34 (2d ed. 1981); Bittker and Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26
UCLA L. REV. 265, 266 (1978), Congress impliedly approved it by partially codifiing it.
I.R.C. § 111(g) (1980) provides: "Gross income does not include income attributable to the
recovery during the taxable year of any amount deducted in any prior taxable year to the
extent such amount did not reduce income subject to tax."
26. Bittker and Kanner, supra note 25, at 270.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1960) provides that during any taxable year income
attributable to the recovery of an amount previously deducted will be excluded from gross
income to the extent that no reduction in tax resulted from the earlier deduction.
28. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir.
1978).
29. See Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972) (per
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Prior to the Hillsboro decision, the TBR applied in two situations:
an actual recovery of an earlier deduction 30 or another event inconsis
tent with the premise on which the prior deduction had been based. 31
The Hillsboro decision, however, redefined the application of the TBR.
The standard now requires that the subsequent event be fundamen
tally inconsistent with the premise on which a deduction was initially
based as well as that the taxpayer obtained a tax benefit from the ear
lier deduction. 32
As clearly expounded by Justice Stevens in his concurring opin
ion, the Hillsboro standard creates confusion in the analysis of the
TBR by requiring a distinction between "inconsistent" events and
"fundamentally inconsistent" events. 33 The Court itself attempted to
distinguish between the two by drawing a line between merely unex
pected events and inconsistent events. 34 The Court highly criticized
the government's approach, which viewed any unexpected event as in
consistent.J5 It failed, however, to offer any guidance as to why an
unexpected event is not fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier de
duction. 36 The real distinction between "fundamentally inconsistent"
events and "inconsistent" events may lie in the actual analysis of the
applicability of the TBR in a given situation. 37
curiam); Bear Mfg. Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1021 (1970); Haynsworth v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 703 (1977), ajJ'd mem, 609 F.2d
1007 (5th Cir. 1979).
30. MERTENS, supra, note 25, at § 734.
31. See Tennessee-Carolina Transp. Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978); Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, III F.2d 60 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 658 (1940). Estate of Block v. Commissioner 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939). For example, a
taxpayer using the accrual accounting method is allowed a tax deduction for expenses ac
crued but not paid as of the close of the taxpayer's taxable year. The TBR requires the
accrual basis taxpayer to include in income accrued expenses deducted in an earlier tax
year, if he/she is later relieved of hislher obligation. Although no actual physical recovery
of the deducted amount by the taxpayer occurs, he/she is required to include the earlier
deducted amount in gross income because of the tax benefit received from the earlier de
duction. From this point of view the taxpayer's argument that a recovery is necessary for
the application of the TBR neither serves the purpose of the rule nor accurately reflects the
case law that established the rule. Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 734, 738 (5th
Cir. 1979). If a recovery is necessary for the TBR to be applicable, then all accrual basis
taxpayers would receive "tax benefits" in the form of accrued expenses which may never be
paid.
32. Hillsboro, 406 U.S. at 383-84.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 383-84. The Court offered no real definition of the term "unexpected
event." The Court's usage and placement of the term suggests that an "unexpected event"
ordinarily occurs only once rather than repeatedly.
35. Id. at 383-84 & nn. 15-16.
36. Id. at 383-86 & nn. 15-16, 393-94.
37. The "fundamentally inconsistent" standard requires a case-by-case analysis when
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The Court presented its new test by stating "only if the occur
rence of the event in the earlier year would have resulted in the disal
lowance of the deduction can the Commissioner require a
compensating recognition of income when the event occurs in a later
year."38 The Court drew on its analysis in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co. 39 in which it upheld an amendment to the Illinois Con
stitution imposing a personal property tax on corporations and similar
entities, but not individuals, against an equal protection challenge by
certain corporations and other non-individual "entities."4O Yet, as
Justice Stevens discussed in his concurrence, the Court suggested that
if it had ruled on Lehnhausen in 1972, the Hillsboro Bank would have
been entitled to deduct the monies paid that were not used to satisfy a
tax liability.41 The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions only for
expenses specifically exc1uded. 42 Consistency with the logic of the
Code required that the Court reach a contrary holding in Hillsboro, if
that were the case, because the premise underlying the deduction no
longer existed after Lehnhausen and the lack of basis for the deduction
would have occured in the same accounting period as the deduction
itself. Internal Revenue Code section 164(e),43 therefore, no longer
applied.
It is well-established that the TBR encompasses the recovery of
pr~viously deducted taxes and that the refund is treated as income in
the year received. 44 Although in the Hillsboro case the Bank did not
assessing the applicability of the TBR. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 385. Additionally, one must
review the congressional history of the nonrecognition provision of the Code which origi
nally gave rise to the deduction in order to determine if any conflict exists between the
Code and TBR. Id. If conflict existed, the Code would supercede the TBR. Id. See infra
notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
38. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at .389.
39. 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
40. Id. at 365.
41. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 418 (1983). (Stevens &
Marshall, J.J., concurring). Justice Stevens implies that if the decision had been reached
prior to the close of the taxpayer's annual accounting period, an adjustment could have
been made to the accounting records to reflect the fact that the Bank was not obligated to
pay state taxes on behalf of its shareholders.
42. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); I.R.C.
§ 161 (1983).
43. See supra note 9.
44. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299-300 (1946); May
fair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Union
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, III F.2d 60, 61 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658
(1940); Universal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 616, 617 (7th Cir. 1940); Nash V. Com
missioner, 88 F.2d 477, 478 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 700 (1937).
In Mayfair Minerals, the duty of the taxpayer to make refunds was subsequently can
celled and the Commissioner determined that under the TBR the previously deducted
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receive the proceeds from the refund,4s it did receive a tax benefit. 46
The TBR, in its simplest form, would have required the inclusion of an
amount equal to the prior deduction in the Bank's current income
upon a finding that the taxpayer derived an earlier tax benefit from the
prior deduction. 47 The Court, however, rejected the simple ap
proach. 48 The Court instead focused on the historical interpretation of
the Internal Revenue Code section on which the deduction was based
to ascertain whether there was Congressional intent to supercede the
application of the TBR.49 The Court concluded that the simple appli
cation of the TBR would not suffice in all situations. so
Balancing the TBR theories of the government and the tax
payer,SI the Court in Hillsboro found that the TBR must be applied on
a case-by-case basis. S2 The purpose and function of the provision
granting the deduction affect the facts and circumstances surrounding
the application of the rule. S3 The Court explained that when a later
event takes place in the context of a nonrecognition provision of the
Code, inherent tension exists between the TBR and that provision. S4
Since the TBR was judicially created, it cannot supercede statutes en
acted by Congress. ss

III.

ANALYSIS

The Court's new approach implies a rule that a conflict between a
nonrecognition provision of the Code and the TBR be resolved in
favor of the Code, regardless of the tax benefit bestowed upon the taxamounts had to be restored to the taxpayer's income. Mayfair Minerals, 456 F.2d at 623.
The Court stated: "When an accrual basis taxpayer accrues an expense and offsets it against
taxable income, and subsequently the expense is not paid, the prior deduction must be
restored to income in the year the liability is extinguished. . . . Taxpayer, having received
the prior tax benefits from accrued deductions realized income." Id. at 629.
45. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 373-74.
46. Id.
47. The primary purpose of the TBR presumably is to allow for a mechanism
whereby the inflexibility of the annual accounting system is neutralized to a degree. Thus at
the time the Illinois statute placing a personal property tax on shares of stock held in
incorporated banks became invalid, the premise for the Bank's deduction, pursuant to
I.R.C. § 164(e), no longer existed. In retrospect, therefore, the deduction should not have
been allowed. See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
48. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 382-83.
49. Id. at 391-94 (construing I.R.C. § 164).
50. Id. at 384-85.
51. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
52. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 385.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 386.
55. Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1979).
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payer. 56 The new approach parallels the position of the Supreme
Court in Nash v. United States 57 and, more recently, of the Fifth Cir
cuit Court of Appeals in Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner. 58 Its applica
tion in Hillsboro, however, differs substantially from the approach
utilized in Nash and Putoma. 59 In them, the Court found that the
earlier deduction was not includable in the taxpayer's gross income
when the later event occurred pursuant to other nonrecognition provi
sions of the Code. 60 In Hillsboro, however, the Court used section
164(e), the very Code provision which gave rise to the initial deduc
tion, in order to find that the Code preempted the TBR. 61 A careful
analysis of that section reveals that no tension exists between the TBR
and the Code under the Hillsboro facts, as was the case in the Nash
and Putoma situations. 62 The Code simply provides that a deduction
shall be allowed if a corporation pays a tax which is imposed on a
shareholder and based on his proportional interest held in that corpo
56. See Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 394-95. Hillsboro suggests that the "tax benefit" re
ceived by the taxpayer is irrelevant in the analysis of whether the TBR and the particular
nonrecogn:tion provision are in conflict. Of major concern is whether the nonrecognition
provision prevails over the TBR. Id. at 385-86.
57. 398 U.S. I (1970).
58. 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979).
59. In Nash, a taxpayer incorporated a partnership under I.R.C. § 351, which pro
vides that no gain or loss on the transfer of assets to a controlled corporation will be recog
nized. Nash, 398 U.S. at 2-3. The partnership had taken bad debt deductions to create a
reserve and, when the partrnership terminated, it no longer needed the reserve. Id. at 4-5.
The accounts receivable together with the reserve were transferred to the corporation. Id.
at 2-3. The Court found that the taxpayer had made no recovery and that no inconsistent
event existed to invoke the TBR. Id. at 5. The Commissioner argued that although a
nonrecognition of gain complied with § 351, the partnership had to acknowledge a gain on
the transfer of the asset since it had, in previous years, taken bad debt deductions to create
the reserve. Id. at 3. Once the accounts receivable left the taxpayer's possession, no fur
ther need remained for the bad debt reserve and, therefore, the premise of the prior deduc
tion became extinguished. Id. at 5.
In Putoma., the court held that the taxpayer corporation, which previously had ac
crued and deducted interest it owed but never paid to one of its shareholders, did not
realize income when the shareholder cancelled the liability for the accrued interest.
Putoma Corp., 601 F.2d at 751. The court found that the cancellation of interest repre
sented a gift to the corporation within the meaning of I.R.C. § 102 as a contribution to
capital within the meaning of I.R.C. § 118. Id. at 751. Hence, I.R.C. § 118, a nonrecogni
tion provision, superceded the TBR. Id.
60. Nash, 398 U.S. at I, 4 (under I.R.C. § 351, no gain or loss is recognized on a
transfer of assets to a controlled corporation in exchange for stock of that corporation);
Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 734, 751 (5th Cir. 1979) (under I.R.C. §§ 102,
118, gifts and contributions to capital do not constitute taxable income). In Nash, I.R.C.
§ 166(c) formed the basis of the initial bad debt deduction used to create the reserve.
Nash, 398 U.S. at 2. In Putoma, the taxpayer deducted the accrued interest expense pursu
ant to I.R.C. § 161. Putoma Corp., 601 F.2d at 238.
61. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 393-94.
62. See supra note 59.
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ration and the corporation is not reimbursed by the shareholder. 63 If
the shareholder need not pay a tax on his interest, no deduction can be
allowed to the corporation pursuant to the Code.64 The Court failed
to cite any other nonrecognition provision in the Code to evidence the
inherent tension described in Nash and Putoma. 6S
In its analysis, the Court went beyond the plain language of the
Code and the Regulations, however, and examined the historical de
velopment of section l64(e).66 Congress intended section l64(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code to provide relief for corporations which volun
tarily made payments of taxes imposed on their shareholders. 67 The
Court stated that nothing in the Code or in Congressional history pre
vented the corporation from taking a deduction if the state held the
tax monies in escrow and refunded them to the shareholders. 68 The
Court particularly stated that the congressional focus of section
l64(e) centered on the act of payment rather than the ultimate use of
the funds. 69 Hence, the Court held that as long as the bank that ini
tially paid the tax did not itself get the refund no reason prevented the
corporation from including the refund to the shareholders in its taxa
ble income. 7o The change in the character of the funds in the hands of
the state does not require the corporation to recognize income. 71
The Court in Hillsboro failed, however, to consider two basic
points. First, the absence of any indication in the Internal Revenue
Code or Congressional history of the particular nonrecognition provi
sion, which would disallow the deduction if the monies were refunded,
does not necessarily imply that the deduction will be allowed.72 To
63. I.R.C. § 164(e) (1954). See supra note 9.
64. Id.
65. In Hillsboro, the Court noted only the I.R.C. § 164(e) nonrecognition provision
as creating tension between the TBR and the Code. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 391-92.
66. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 393-94.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 394. The Court stated:
[I]t is difficult to conclude Congress intended that the corporation have no
deduction if the State turned the tax revenues over to . . . independent parties.
We conclude that the purpose of § 164(e) was to provide relief for corporations
making these payments, and the focus of Congress was on the act of payment
rather than on the ultimate use of the funds by the State.
Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 394. Under the Court's analysis, which deemed the refund of the state
personal property tax to be an unexpected event, the only fundamentally inconsistent event
which could trigger the application of the TBR would be a recovery. Id.
71. Id. at 394-95.
72. The Court narrowed its focus at this point by questioning only whether the Bank
actually had received the refund. A better analysis would have been to focus on the general
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the contrary, the basic principle of the Internal Revenue Code is to tax
all accretions to wealth unless specifically excluded by the Code. 73
The Court continued by stating that it is "difficult to conclude that
Congress intended that the corporation have no deduction if the state
turned the tax revenues over to independent parties."74 A careful ex
amination of the facts, however, reveals that from the outset, the mon
ies in question were held in an escrow account and not by the Illinois
state treasurer75 and that the state treasurer did not voluntarily refund
the money to the shareholders. 76 Not until the Illinois appellate divi
sion decided Bank & Trust Company v. Cullerton 77 was it determined
that the monies belonged to the shareholders. 78 Secondly, and more
importantly, a section 164(e) deduction is premised on the theory that
the bank paid a personal property tax that represented an obligation of
its shareholder. 79 A deduction cannot be allowed pursuant to section
164(e) when in fact no tax obligation existed,80 as Lehnhausen 81
proved. Justice Blackmun stated it best in his dissenting opinion.
Speaking of the application of the TBR in the Hillsboro case, he said
"[T]he propriety of the. . . deduction by the Bank depended upon the
payment by the Bank of a state tax on its shares. This Court's decision
in Lehnhausen. . . rendered any such tax nonexistent and any deduc
tion therefore unavailable."82
When the Court assessed the applicability of the TBR in Hillsboro
it should have focused on the payment of tax by the taxpayer rather
than the recipient of the refund. 83 The TBR embodies the basic princi
ple of disallowing a taxpayer a "tax benefit" from an earlier deduction
policy of the Code: to tax all accretions to wealth not specifically excluded by the Code.
See Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 426,430 (1955).
73. Id.
74. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 394.
75. Id. at 373.
76. The county treasurer refunded the amounts in escrow attributable to shares held
by individuals. Id.
77. 25 III. App. 3d 721, 324 N.E.2d 29 (1975).
78. Id. at 726, 324 N.E.2d at 33.
79. See supra note 9.
80. I.R.C. § 161 (1983) allows deductions from taxable income for expenses incurred
during the ordinary course of business. If the expense does not fall within the parameters
of § 161, the Commissioner allows no deduction.
8!. 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
82. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. For a taxpayer to deduct an expense, I.R.C. § 161 (1983) requires that the ex
pense fall into allowable deductions under the Code. In Hillsboro, the deduction taken by
the Bank did not qualify. Since the tax imposed by the state of Illinois was repealed in
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973), no reason existed for the
allowance of the deduction.
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when later events indicate that he was not entitled to it. 84 If no other
nonrecognition provision of the Code is in conflict with the TBR, as in
Nash and Putoma,85 and neither Code language nor Congressional his
tory indicate a conflict, application of the TBR must follow in order to
disallow a "tax benefit" bestowed upon a taxpayer who was not enti
tled to it.
One explanation for the Hillsboro decision might be its treatment
of the shareholder and the Bank as separate entities. 86 Since the state
repealed the tax 87 and declared the refund to belong to the sharehold
ers,88 the Court might have thought itself obligated to allow the de
duction despite the absence of any factual basis for it. Using a "but
for" approach, the Court might have reasoned that the allowance of a
deduction by the Bank pursuant to section 164(e) led the Bank to pay
the shareholder's tax. When the Cullerton court held that the monies
kept in escrow belonged to the shareholders,89 the Court might have
concluded that it would be penalizing the Bank by requiring it to in
clude the monies in taxable income. 9o
IV.

CONCLUSION

The "fundamentally inconsistent" theory complicates the tax sys
tem. "Inconsistent event" analysis forces a deviation from the tradi
tional pattern of calculating income during a given year. The
traditional pattern simply identified the transactions that made the
taxpayer wealthier, determined the history of those transactions which
should be characterized as having produced income, and then deter
mined how much of the income must be recognized. The new theory
advanced by the Hillsboro Court requires an analysis of the Congres
sional history of a nonrecognition provision each and every time the
TBR may be applicable. The new analysis complicates implementa
tion of the tax system by requiring interpretation of Congressional in
84. See Bittker and Kanner, supra note 25 at 265-66.
85. See supra note 59.
86. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 394.
87. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
88. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cullerton, 25 Ill. App. 3d 721, 726, 324 N.E.2d 29, 33
(1975).
89. Id.
90. By allowing the deduction by the Bank to be unaffected by the TBR, the Court,
in effect, allowed the Bank to deduct a dividend to its shareholders. Such a deduction
offends the general structure of the corporate tax provisions. I.R.C. § 301 (1954).
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tent concerning a provision to find possible conflict with the TBR. It
exacerbates an already complicated system.
Martin J. Jennings, Jr.

